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Thinking Like a Man? The Cultures of Science.                       
Lynne Segal 
‘Reading too much to see, writing too much to think’, licensed intellectuals 
today are usually too cut off from wider audiences even to deserve the 
Wildean derision they once received. Yet the public domain has its well-
known hazards. Academics rarely set its agenda, even when we do manage 
to address an audience beyond the barely-read journals stringent funding 
bodies force us into. Accordingly, I did not set the agenda when I agreed to 
present a session in Birkbeck's public lecture series: Close Encounters: 
Culture Meets Science. An odd situation, when I have tried to be the 
sternest critic of the dualism such ‘encounter’ excites - however intimate. 
The battle lines are familiar in Britian’s upmarket media: while well-
known psychiatrist Raj Persuad can be heard arguing that science needs 
art, the equally recognizable biologist Lewis Wolpert insists that never the 
twain shall meet.  
Beyond binary conflicts, however, not only does culture include science 
but, more significantly, science includes culture. To say this is to say, one 
might think, very little; yet it remains profoundly contentious – the ground 
for endless battles. It is to suggest, merely, that at any time we come to the 
sphere of science with all our everyday pre-conceptions in place. At least 
in the world of human and social affairs, the nature of the empirical 
research which gets done and, in particular, the way it is broadcast and 
popularised, whether by scientists or their promoters, always reflects the 
assumptions and goals of the culture around it, or certain pockets of it. And 
in the dazzling techno-world we now occupy the extraordinary degree of 
information available to us itself triggers ubiquitous debates over science, 
which is altogether a good thing if – and only if - it does not lead to instant 
polarizations.  
Culture includes science; science includes culture; yet it is certain 
that, throughout modern times, it is a mutual stand-off between what is 
seen as the two separate traditions which has encouraged the most 
intensely sectarian forms of professional rivalry, animosity and conflict, 
both within and without the academy. The eternal return of wars 
supposedly between culture and science or, put more judiciously, within 
the “two cultures”, take us back at least to where most date the birth of 
Reason, to the 1780s. This was when the philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(troubled by David Hume’s empiricism) awakened from his ‘dogmatic 
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slumber’ to announce that ‘objects conform to concepts and not concepts 
to objects’: we can never simply know ‘things-in-themselves’.   
Philosophers have continued to argue the toss ever since. Predominantly 
concerned with scientific knowledge and the nature of things, what is 
loosely known as Anglo-American Philosophy would repeatedly repudiate 
the more speculative disposition of what is just as inexactly labelled 
European Philosophy, with its focus on the nature of human existence and 
its insistence that, as the appropriately French essayist, Montaigne, put it 
(back in the 16th century) we ‘need to interpret interpretations more than to 
interpret things’ (a mere 400 years before its cutting–edge repetition by 
reputed post-structuralists, citing Derrida). In the beginning was the Word, 
God said. (So we know whose side S/He’s on!). Those who most stridently 
like to declare themselves the spokesmen of Science today, we’ll see, offer 
a similar, unifying mantra: in the Beginning was the Gene, and in 
rhetorical mimicry, they do battle with God, Creationist myths or those 
whom, with peculiarly American antinomian perversity, fold antagonistic 
authorities into the one force, declaring themselves ‘Creation Scientists’. 
The eternal repetition of clashes between the empiricist and 
interpretive worldviews was already troubling John Stuart Mill back in the 
19th century, very much as it troubles some today: ‘the one doctrine is 
accused of making men beasts, the other lunatics’. With Darwin currently 
trouncing Freud in opinion polls, the Beasts are holding out against the 
Lunatics, for this is more than ever a time when, with whatever levels of 
misunderstanding and ignorance, an all-pervading ‘culture of science’ 
surrounds us. Yet the preconceptions and irrationalities kept hidden within 
ruling presumptions of the shared neutrality of scientific investigation, its 
widespread failure to interpret its own interpretations, suggest to me that 
the lunatics may yet have the last laugh or, perhaps, the ultimate self-
reflexive weep. And just one way of seeing this, as those like feminists 
(forever the devilish harbingers of anti-scientism) have been arguing for at 
least a generation now, is by looking at the gendered symbolism, the 
gendered stories of science.  
The Gender of Knowledge 
It can hardly be news to learn that in Western thought the gender of 
science, indeed, the gender of knowledge, has always been seen as 
masculine. In the 18th century, women and knowledge were a type of 
oxymoron, an absurd conjunction, placing women in danger of ridicule or 
ostracism; at best, of banishment from her sex: ‘Never was a woman so 
learned as she’, as Voltaire praised the Marquise Emilie du Chatelet (for 
promoting Newtonian physics), adding ‘She was a great man whose only 
fault was in being a woman’. In Britain, when Elizabeth Montague wanted 
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to create and endow the first women’s college in 1775, she was turned 
down by Anna Barbauld, the prominent London poet and literary critic she 
wanted to head it up, advised to abandon her plans at once. Women must 
keep their learning secret, she was told: ‘in our sex knowledge must be 
only connived at while carefully concealed’; displayed it will be punished 
with disgrace. She was for the most part right. Mary Wollstonecraft would 
be dealt the fate Barbauld feared: seen as betraying her sex and of 
‘thinking like a man’ when, inspired by the French Revolution, she formed 
the radical dissenting community of Stoke Newington and argued for 
women’s education to permit their participation in the public sphere. It 
being the time of her time, Wollstonecraft herself would accept with pride 
the observation that she ‘thought like a man’. Today she, like our closest 
foremother, Simone de Beauvoir, stands condemned by some 
contemporary feminist scholars for ever having aspired to embrace 
Enlightenment beliefs in the enticements of rationality. Though here, still, 
we remain trapped within the same dualistic scheme positioning women as 
either the degraded or the esoteric outside of masculine reasoning.  
It is not only the physical and biological sciences that have been 
regarded as ‘masculine’, authoritative, distanced from women’s natural 
inclination and interests - except when situating them as the objects of 
interrogation. The social or human sciences as well have themselves been 
seen as part of the scientific project to the extent that – and only to the 
extent that – they arrogated the quantitative methodology thought 
appropriate to the ‘hard’ sciences, despite the fact that human images, 
feelings and thoughts, do not arrive in quantitative mode. It is also clear 
that the attribute of ‘hardness’ sought after here is strictly metonymic of 
the masculine when its antithesis is not the attribute of being ‘easy’, but 
rather of being ‘soft’. The recent reworking of more Continental modes of 
interpretive, narrative or discourse analytic methods in the social sciences 
exemplify these newer ‘soft’ methodologies. They are, it is true, often 
favoured, though far from exclusively, by the feminist scholars and other 
dissidents who have scrambled into the academy, changing its nature over 
the last three decades. Although, one might think, few modes of reasoning 
could be conceptually more demanding than their origins, in hermeneutics 
and phenomenological philosophy.  
This is why it is on the question mark that the weight of my title 
falls, Thinking Like a Man? We can all flesh out the clichÈ, knowing well 
enough what supposedly neutral, detached, confrontational approaches are 
thereby invoked. But whatever familiar routines constitute the 
performative aspect of this notion, it is always a context bound and 
slippery one: however easy it is to illustrate that men’s privileged access to 
knowledge and naming in science, at least until recently, has been as 
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apparent in their chosen research as in their texts. Women are more than 
capable of just such ‘masculine’ performative pugnacity. Indeed, however 
inescapable its dimorphic insinuations, it is now quite as fashionable for 
Queer Feminists (after Eve Sedgwick; Judith Halberstam) - if not for last 
season’s French Feminists (after Cixoux; Irigaray) or this season’s 
Deleuzians (such as Rosi Braidotti) - to assert their own claims to ‘female 
masculinity’. As I see it, any such gendered identification is always 
ambivalent and fugitive, however assiduously men (or women) work to 
embody it. Masculinity, I believe, exists primarily as symbolic self-
authorisation and entrapment, rather than as any adjustable solution, to our 
continuing entanglements in gender hierarchy, entanglements that 
nonetheless materially still pervade the acquisition of knowledge and the 
cultures of science.  
In the nineteenth century, it was again the formation of radical 
political movements, Owenites in its first half, suffrage campaigns at its 
close, which sought women’s access to the wider world of education and 
knowledge. One way of trying to bypass men’s resistance to women’s 
participation in the public sphere was to justify women’s learning not for 
its own sake, for women’s self-emancipation, but for its public usefulness 
via the virtues women could spread in the community, exemplify for the 
poor, bring to the sick & elderly. (Hence the rise of women in Social 
Work, and its accompanying still disparaging connotations.) But it was the 
newly triumphant scientific establishment itself which would for a while 
continually throw its weight against the education of women when the rise 
of the scientific professionals, enhanced by the impact of Darwinian 
thought at the end of the 19th century, established them as the newly 
enshrined arbiters and authorities of human affairs.  
They produced a crescendo of evidence entailing the necessary 
exclusion of women from science, with feminism, in its first wave, quickly 
synonymous with madness, sterility and the engendering of social decay. 
As Rita Felski, among others, notes in The Gender of Modernity, the 
irrational behaviour of the female hysteric, along with emergent 
conceptions of sexuality as the truth of the self, lay at the heart of the birth 
of both psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Narratives of cultural decline, 
symbolised by the ‘feminine’, the ‘soft’, the ‘woolly’ and superstitious, 
would prove the inescapable metaphor of the cultures of science. As most 
readers will know, in their feminist classic, For Her Own Good, in the 
1970s, Ehrenreich and English argued that the paradigm ‘allegory of 
science versus superstition’ involved the deligitimation and displacement 
of midwives, as the initially exclusively male medical profession took over 
the sphere of gynaecology. It was this same scientific elite which well into 
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the 20th century could still confidently censure the stimulation of women’s 
brains for inducing atrophy of the uterus.  
Not until the 1970s, with its tidal wave of feminist thought and 
activism, would women manage seriously to question that earlier 
triumphalist march of science, challenging the presumptive neutrality of its 
experts. Subsequent battles of knowledge fought by the same branch of the 
medical profession in the closing decades of the twentieth century would 
thus once again bring the scientific establishment up against a new breed 
of angry, emotional young feminists. And it would culminate in the 
resurgence of midwifery, alongside a rejection of notions of pregnancy as a 
pathological condition and a new stress on the personal support systems 
available for women before, during and after pregnancy. Such wild and 
woolly demands from women a mere thirty years ago are little more than 
the substance of scientific knowledge today. There are now many new 
disputes, over artificial insemination, surrogate motherhood, induced 
births, episiotomies as those guarding this particular institutionalized 
branch of knowledge are drawn into other battles, for example, with 
women wanting to give birth outside heterosexual unions, to create 
‘designer’ babies or with Third World critics protesting at the racism of 
using their populations for the testing or dumping of risky drugs. It was in 
this domain, as well, that scholars exploring the cultures of science 
provided more fine grained detail on the telling mischievous nature of the 
metaphors of science, Well known here is the work of the Princeton 
anthropologist Emily Martin, engaged in her own scientific observations of 
the habits of those working in research laboratories in the US, memorably 
illustrating the stereotypical, near pornographic imagery of passive 
'femininity' and active 'masculinity' finding its way into apparently 
mechanistic accounts of the movements of sperm and ovum in scientific 
texts of reproductive biology. 
 
Cultures of Criticism 
For many this is all a well-known tale. The language of science cannot be 
accepted as the detached mirror of reality many hope, neither truth nor 
objectivity turn out to be the unproblematic concepts that scientists (and a 
world so dependent upon the fruits of their labour) once hoped them to be. 
Nonetheless, it would seem inanity to devalue, let alone deny, the 
awesome benefits of science (whether it’s heating systems, heart surgery, 
space travel or virtual realities which dazzle or persuade us), however 
embattled we might also become over the existing and potential hazards 
accompanying its achievements (whether it’s global warming, nuclear 
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warfare or genetic engineering which fill us with foreboding). Too true. 
Nonetheless, it is the case that applied knowledge, how we as humans 
manage to survive and thrive in the world, is never synonymous with 
scientific understanding. Harvard geneticist, Richard Lewontin, among 
others, illustrates this in The Doctrine of DNA, noting that major progress 
in applied science can be made without any understanding of the 
underlying scientific principles. Farmers were able to obtain steadily 
improved varieties of crop plants centuries ahead the scientific 
understanding of the principles of heredity and the birth of modern 
genetics. Conversely, we know something about the genetic origins of 
certain illnesses, like haemophilia, without the least idea how to cure them.  
Feminist scholar and activist, Cindy Patton, similarly, points out that 
American gay communities began organizing around safer sex practices, 
and dramatically lowered the rates of HIV infection, before the HIV virus 
and the specific modes of its communication of the disease were isolated 
or understood. Indeed it has been the growing faith in a medical solution to 
AIDS which has seen a decline in safer sex practices in the West, while 
recent reports in the UK confirm that the arrival of antiretroviral drugs has 
accompanied a rise in HIV infection rates. Neither factually informative 
fear based appeals, nor knowledge of existing medical management, have 
ever been alone been successful in stopping the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases. This is why Jonathan Silin, addressing the challenge 
of successful sex education for young people, concludes: ‘From HIV/AIDS 
we learn about the limits of science and the importance of human vision, 
the frailty of the body and the strength of the spirit, the need to nurture the 
imagination even as we direct our attention to rational cognitive structure.’ 
Far from being irrational, critical engagement with the role and application 
of scientific knowledge, noting which areas of enquiry receive funding, 
which people undertake research, and with what agenda, forms the 
necessary underpinning of a healthy culture of science.  
The sudden loss of Britain’s most enthusiastic historian of science, 
Roy Porter, with his gargantuan contributions to the dissemination of 
medical knowledge, should remind us of the absolute necessity for just 
such a critical engagement with the history and culture of science. As his 
research on mental illness unveils, yesterday’s scientific data on the 
effectivity of insulin therapy, lobotomy, mosquito stings, lithium or 
whatever, speedily become today’s horror stories, even as the side-effects 
of the latest round of psychotropic drugs seem certain to keep their 
manufacturers in the courtrooms, not so long after their products leave the 
laboratories. For it is the pharmaceutical corporations themselves, we now 
authoritatively learn, which increasingly fund and guide much of the 
research data we read. Just one of the dangers here was highlighted in 
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Toronto not long ago, when British psychiatrist David Healy lost his job 
offer at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health after a speech was 
seen as conflicting with the Centre’s pharmaceutical sponsors.  
I do not myself doubt that there are significant benefits in the 
‘serotonin revolution’, which have made anti-depressants like Prozac the 
most widely sought after of prescribed drugs. On the positive side, 
‘madness’ loses some of its deadly stigma when the current escalating 
levels of acute depression are accepted as relatively ‘normal’ and when 
new medications, reducing all our psychological anguish, pain and 
delusions to biochemistry, seem to promise to eliminate even the severest 
states of suicidal anxiety or psychosis. Once madness condemned women, 
especially, to lifetimes of institutionalised silence. Today, more privileged, 
loquacious and media friendly women, such as Elizabeth Wurtzel, may 
find that surviving milder forms of mental suffering can foster a successful 
career move into publishing ventures, authorizing the blossoming genre of 
self-narration. ‘Most people are sick, only few know this is something they 
can be proud of’, as Karl Kraus once quipped of psychoanalysis. More 
now share his defensive joke. On the downside, however, the reduction of 
personal misery to biomedical agendas and corporate profit means that the 
cultural contexts, social stress and discrimination which render certain 
groups of people more vulnerable to particular forms of mental distress (as 
women have been, and though in a declining ratio, still remain) can be 
ignored, while the desperately needed public provision for the care of the 
more vulnerable can be sidelined. Thoroughly specious belief in the 
medical elimination or control of personal misery thus leaves the many 
who in actuality continue to suffer appallingly all the more destitute and 
outcaste.  
This is not just a fault line in the scientific understanding and 
treatment of an area as conceptually troublesome and ambiguous as mental 
illness. Similar problems can arise in relation to the most uncontroversial 
identifications of physical illness. Medical science has long dreamed of 
eliminating every invasive infection, which manages to elude our body’s 
immune system. Some saw the emblematic consummation of at that dream 
in the declaration of the global eradication of smallpox in 1980 (the first 
year no deaths from the disease was reported) following more than twenty 
years of unparalleled international co-operation supplying free 
vaccinations against it. Yet, given that it is more than 200 years since the 
relevant vaccine was developed, it was, of course, not any new scientific 
discovery but rather the eventual and international co-operation of hundred 
of thousands of people, unmatched ever before or since, at many different 
levels over a period of twenty years, which finally seemed to eliminate the 
disease.  
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Since then the dream should have become only ever more suspect. 
New deadly microbes manage to mutate and survive just as fast as 
scientists breed vaccines to eliminate them. The delusory scientific dream 
of total conquest of disease is popularly encouraged, with the 
pharmaceutical search for new ‘magic bullets’, when what is most needed 
is global cooperation to control the creation and spread of new infectious 
disease. This would mean providing the clean drinking water (unavailable 
to 20% of the world’s population) and adequate resources for all people to 
maintain the healthy bodies which are less prone to incubate and spread 
disease, alongside world-wide vaccination programmes to treat existing 
preventable diseases. Although easily verifiable as the wisest strategy for 
world health, current funding for biomedical science does nothing to 
promote them. As New York biologist Robert Pollack notes, the medical 
elimination of disease is a battle that can never finally be won against a 
microbial army of viruses, bacteria and parasites, whose simple genome 
allows for their massively speedier mutation and survival than any amount 
of imagined human genetic intervention could produce in the vastly 
smaller numbers of immeasurably more genetically complex human 
species. Arguing for a drastic change of strategy in Western health 
priorities, Pollack concludes that current practices provide ‘a sad example 
of scientific denial at work’: ‘There will be no magic bullets that do not 
selectively breed equally powerful microbes aimed right back at us’.  
 
Wars of Science  
With whatever false hopes, both governments and industry now pour more 
money than ever before into scientific research. In Britain, the tirelessly 
invoked ‘new’ of New Labour is all but synonymous with a belief in 
efficient market forces seen as the outcome of a ‘knowledge-driven 
economy’, with science and technology its blood pump. There has been 
massive state investment in scientific research councils, unprecedented 
expansion in research laboratories and funding for those seen as 
entrepreneurs of science across higher education, in line with the 
government’s University Challenge scheme. In the USA money flows even 
faster into scientific research, with the National Institute of Health (NIH), 
responsible for biomedical research soaring to $18 billion (an increase of 
over 400% in two decades) Tellingly, a few scientists have themselves at 
times questioned the direction of this massive funding, like many at the 
Harvard University Medical School questioning the phenomenal corporate 
and state funds now spent on the Human Genome Project. Officially, 
however, Western governments, industry and the media overall are in 
agreement that the fate and efficiency of humanity can be equated with the 
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celebration of science. Here, we have an endowed Chair at Oxford 
University, paralleling many more in the USA, exclusively dedicated to 
making science more accessible and more popular in culture generally. 
Indeed, culture itself is increasingly biologized, in the influential writing of 
Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins and other evolutionary psychologists, 
combining genetic determinism and cybernetic metaphors to present the 
human brain as pre-programmed for the replication of invariant cultural 
artefacts, or ‘memes’. 
 Surprisingly, one might think, just when we see such unprecedented 
public spending on and promotion of science, its leading advocates use 
their platforms to insist we live in a culture where science is not treated 
with respect. They condemn either its alleged ‘dumbing down’ in the 
mainstream media, or its reputed disparagement by a self-serving literary 
elite said to be dominating the academy. The old lament of the literary 
disdain for ‘the men with the future in their bones’ made by the physicist 
turned middle-brow novelist, C.P.Snow, in 1959, was sounded anew, ever 
more stridently, throughout the 1990s. Writing of the contemporary 
academy, Paul Gross and Norman Leavitt made their mark in both 
scholarly and popular arenas in the USA in 1994, with Higher 
Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science. They 
argued that the relativism of social constructionism and fashionable post-
modernism, combined with the rise of cultural studies and the attacks of 
feminist, anti-racist and environmentalist critics, had undermined the 
authority of science in the universities. In agreement, the New York 
Academy of Sciences hosted a conference the following year, ‘The Flight 
from Science and Reason’. That same year, the illustrious North American 
space scientist, Carl Sagan, writing shortly before his death, saw the flame 
of science spluttering with the fragility of a Marilyn Monroe or Princess 
Diana, flickering like ‘a Candle in the Dark’ in a ‘Demon-Haunted World’ 
Another year on, and the Left-leaning American physicist, Alan Sokal, 
grasped his moment of fame in 1996, hoaxing the Cutlural Studies journal 
Social Text, supposedly in support of embracing hard material truths over 
meretricious cultural relativities. He was ably assisted by two feminist 
scholars, Barbara Epstein and Ruth Rosen, embittered by the glamour of 
feminist cultural theorists inside the academy compared with the neglect 
accorded others concerned with women’s activism outside it.  
In the UK, two of Britain’s best-known scientists, Lewis Wolpert 
and Richard Dawkins, have throughout taken up the baton in these 
resurgent Culture Wars: the former to protect the universal precepts of 
science from the follies of other discourses, ‘there being only one correct 
explanation for any observed phenomenon’; the latter (inverting the lament 
of Auden on finding himself in the company of scientists) declares that it is 
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the latter who are made to 'feel like shabby curates among literary dukes' 
Like other science popularisers, Dawkins denounces the ‘condescending 
and patronising’ tones of a cultural elite which eschews the rigours and 
sophistication of science: those who smile as Richard Rorty jests, ‘we are 
all literary critics now’. So allow me, in my final section, to try to convince 
you of just how very muddle-headed these contests have become. For 
certain, we need to pay more, not less, attention to the complexities, 
possibilities and dangers attending all the new technologies of science. 
Many cultural theorists have only recently begun to do this, though some 
feminists and environmentalists kicked off, sometimes rather blindly, from 
this stance. But science, as I keep saying, exists inside culture, and the so-
called Culture Wars, or Culture Vs Science Wars, are battles which are 
being fought most passionately, and crucially, within the strictest 
boundaries of science itself, however narrow our definitions, with gender 
and sexual difference a central concern.  
Tellingly, the actual issue of Cultural Text targeted by Sokal and his 
supporters, was called Science Wars, with articles by three biologists, two 
anthropologists and seven other social scientists. In it, Emily Martin wrote 
of the predominantly mutually respectful relations between herself and the 
practising scientists she studied, with some reproductive biologists not 
only intrigued by her analysis of the cultural stereotyping in their own 
research but using it to trigger new questions. The sociologist, Hilary Rose, 
trenchantly put the case for building complex alliances to encourage the 
most open, critical, helpful exchanges around the nature and uses of 
scientific research, sensitive to the challenge which ‘localized, responsible 
and embodied knowledges’ pose for any single, unitary notion of scientific 
discourse. The supposed literary dukes of high theory (usually Derridian 
deconstructionists, with now a sprinkling of Deleuzian rhizomatics) were 
not in evidence, except as mimicked by the two feminists informing Sokal.  
The other contributors, however, did have a common outlook: the 
impact of science is far too important to leave to professional scientists 
alone, least of all, to any over-simplifiers who anoint themselves its 
spokesmen. This is why Bruno Latour would later write of the Sokal affair, 
‘Let’s be serious. The sciences are too fragile to deprive themselves of the 
rare allies that are to be found in the domain of the humanities and the 
social sciences.  
All of us, researchers in exact and less exact sciences, politicians and 
users, we would do well to possess the most realistic vision possible 
of what the sciences can and cannot do. We are all in the same boat, 
afloat in the same controversies.’   
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I like the sentiments, but they are somewhat misleading, even when 
restricted to empirical researchers. Some scientists captain multi-billion 
ocean liners. Others attempt to paddle their canoes up the muddiest creeks, 
aware of the complexity, the unpredictability, the disorder surrounding 
every aspect of human activity - from the triggering of DNA modules to 
the practice, avoidance or obstacles of following one’s hearts desire. 
 
Biological Tales and Predatory Males 
The prominent captains are the men (and they are mainly men, with Lena 
Cosmides, one of the few equivalent contenders) who have the most 
ambitious dreams, and a very particular view of science, one rejected by 
many others. As John DuprÈ pointed out in The Disorder of Things, their 
vision returns us to the founding metaphors of Western science, over three 
centuries ago, with its fantasy that the explanation of all life, from the 
molecular to the social, could be explained in terms of a few single 
overarching laws. It is to sustain belief in this underpinning simplicity 
beneath the disarming complexity of life that we find again the flagrant 
misappropriations of Darwin’s legacy, overturning much that one might 
have thought we woke up to long ago. So for Dawkins, the first axiom of 
science is that: 'Plants and animals alike are all - in their immensely 
complicated, enmeshed ways doing the same fundamental thing, which is 
propagating genes.'  
This time around, however, Darwinian notions of descent through 
natural selection are used (most often) not, as before, to confirm racial 
hierarchy (racism usually arrives culturally freighted nowadays) but rather 
to shore up the ever more ambiguous blueprint for sexual difference. 
Whatever contingent identities may be dreamt up in feminist philosophies, 
we are told, scientific law and order comes from the sex cells: ‘the 
"gametes" of males are smaller and more numerous than the gametes of 
females', Dawkins explains, 'it is possible to interpret all other differences 
between the sexes as stemming from this one basic difference... Female 
exploitation begins here', he decared in 1976. All human behaviour, his 
American counterpart, E.O.Wilson, echoes, 'faithfully' obeys this one 
biological principle: 'It pays males to be aggressive, hasty, fickle [and] 
undiscriminating . . . females to be coy, to hold back until they can identify 
the male with the best genes'.On  The rest is now EP, evolutionary 
psychology, on the rise throughout the 1990s within my own discipline of 
psychology, and well beyond. EP is eager to stress that it recognises the 
role of culture, which result in individual and cultural differences, although 
such variations are not the objects of its concern. The respect for culture is 
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misleading, when that domain is itself biologized as well – now seen as 
flexible superstructure, not fundamental base. As John Tooby and Lena 
Cosmides spell out, evolutionary psychology can provide us with the 
fundamental ‘building blocks out of which cultures themselves are 
manufactured’ through ‘content-specific evolved psychologies’. 
EP therefore sidelines all that is unique, culturally diverse and 
individually specific about human behaviour, that is, the richer detail any 
of us might supply about our lives. In seeking out only putative 
behavioural universals and consigning them to the operation of postulated 
invariant cognitive modules, depicted as genetic adaptations, it is to gender 
contrasts they repeatedly return (which unravel as precisely the normative 
behaviours which are today as spectacularly controversial as they are 
dramatically contested): sexually dimorphic mating strategies; men's 
preference for younger mates; women's desire for mates with resources; 
sex-linked shifts in mate selection across the life span; patterns of spousal 
and same-sex murder etc. Sexy Science, devoid of Romance, but 
overflowing with polemical intent, we could characterise the genre. 
Throughout the 1990s the best-selling science promoter, Robert Wright, 
ridiculed feminists seeking equality with men as doomed by … foolish 
denial of the 'harsh Darwinian truths' about human nature: 'Feminists are 
right to dread some of the rhetorical [note] resistance Darwinism will abet'. 
Expressing specious concern that feminism may falter from its own 
'doctrinal absurdities', he challenges us to face up to the evolutionary basis 
of 'the "natural" male impulse to control female sexuality', 'men's natural 
tendencies to greater promiscuity', 'natural selection' for men to make 'the 
Madonna-whore distinction', concluding. ‘Human males are by nature 
oppressive, possessive, flesh-obsessed pigs'. Put more judiciously by David 
Buss, John Archer and others, assertions of the inevitability of men’s 
predatory chase of attractive young females with large breasts and small 
waists is indeed one of the most frequent cited explanatory accounts in EP. 
‘Ask the American President!’, or ‘Look at the second wives of most 
academics!’, as Charles Jencks reports E.O.Wilson concluding his lectures, 
with a grin and a wink, in 1998.  Is this more than pseudo-scientific 
pornography? Let me join the fun!  
I was recently reading some field research on family relationships 
written up by sociologist Judith Stacey, after interviewing American 
couples about their sex lives. And she does indeed have a ‘Men are Pigs 
file’. Here’s some of her data.:  
‘[Unlike me] Lance can’t get turned on by someone he respects and loves; 
he can only have sex with someone he’s not emotionally committed to … I 
couldn’t tolerate it, so I had to move out’ 
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‘When I came home from work the other night, Jake … was totally in 
heat. And we had sex. We didn’t make love … and it’s like I woke up 
the next morning, and it’s like, I just felt so … shitty. Why did I do 
that? I said it was great, I got off, but I feel rotten. I have felt rotten 
the last two days’ 
‘Let’s face it. When you reach a certain age, men are either already 
taken or they’re looking for someone younger & more beautiful. We 
all know how men are dogs. Absolute dogs’.  
And so the less predatory lovers lament. Or sometimes, they get what they 
want, and celebrate  
‘Rob and I just fell like I don’t know I’ve fallen before. He knocks my 
socks off and its damn near everything I want in a man; he’s kind, 
loving, compassionate, gives of himself to others and his community 
…’.  
The lovers? Well, as I suspect you won’t be surprised to learn, these all too 
familiar erotic griefs and desires, come with a twist? They may be the 
clichÈs of EP, evocative of patriarchal precedent and radical feminist or 
‘feminazi’ slogans, but they are, of course, the voices of men: the 
experiences of some men with other men, both gay, and all with  their 
chromosomes, primary and secondary biological apparatus, all male – no 
transsexuals.  
Certainly, I could also cite evidence of straight men boasting of their 
many sexual conquests in the 35 countries David Buss visited, where in 
line with their expected behaviour, they reported three or four times the 
number of sexual couplings with 'young and attractive' partners compared 
to the women interviewed around them. For this actually to have occurred, 
as sceptics have noticed, we need only assume that a tiny minority of 
enormously hyperactive, young and beautiful women were weirdly 
fighting their nature to oblige this huge army of randy men. Another way 
of seeing things would be to suggest that such self-proclaimed virility 
scores suggest a type of shared cultural identity work performed by many 
men, rather than any evolved adaptations. For if we look beyond such 
gender clichÈ, at the broader scope of historical and sexological research, 
it is hard not admit that there could hardly be less fit between evolutionary 
predictions and shifting human sexual and reproductive practices. In the 
West gender polarised differences are fast diminishing, non-procreative, 
lesbian and gay sexual practices are flourishing, birth rates dropping, 
single motherhood increasing, same sex parenting on the rise, women 
cohabiting and marrying, if they do, later in life and more women and men 
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remaining childless. Mr Wright and fellow neo-Darwinians meet women 
freer to choose how we want to live, though regretfully, rarely in 
conditions of our own choosing The only response of EP to gender shifts 
and diversities is simply to subsume it, to insist, like Tooby and Cosmides, 
that the similarities they can point to are more important than the 
differences: ‘the variable features of culture can be learned solely because 
of the existence of an encompassing universal human metaculture’. 
That is not the view of many biologists, such as Steven Rose, Steve 
Jones and the late Stephen Gould, who see their own biological labours 
mocked by the pseudo-scientific posturing of evolutionary psychology, 
with their deceptive accounts of invariant cognitive structures specifically 
designed for Stone Age life on the African savannah. For Darwin, 
evolution was never narrowly, or even primarily, a biological affair, but a 
slow, heterogeneous, profoundly environmental process. Quite staggering 
changes in the nature of the world occur with few, if any, ties to genetic 
change. Human cultures, the product of individually and collectively 
constrained human choices, are passed on in speedy and direct Lamarckian 
fashion; while genetic evolution moves along the infinitely slower, indirect 
pathways of Darwinian random mutation, natural selection and 
contingency. This is why we learn so little of significance in resorting to 
evolutionary explanations of human behaviour. We cannot reverse the reel 
to explain why we are the way we are, when there is no unifying principle 
which drives either genetic or social change. We do all need to be more 
science friendly, to be more knowledgeable that inside any of its 
disciplines there is a complex multiplicity of explanatory levels. But some 
scientific voices are more likely to be heard than others, when scientists 
can succumb as easily as tabloid editors, clerics or fortune-tellers, to shared 
desires for simplicity. As chemist and elegiac writer Primo Levi cautioned 
scientists and poets alike: ‘The greater part of historical and natural 
phenomena are not simple, or are not simple in the way that we would 
like’. It is the unifiers of science who, in insisting upon their mono-causal 
narratives, mimic in both rhetoric and reductionism the religious foe they 
fear.  
 
Science as Politics 
Finally, let me all too briefly further politicize this quasi-religious, 
biogenetic turn. Never before have social problems - present and future - 
been so swiftly translated into illusive individual responsibilities, requiring 
individual solutions. Gene talk is metonymic of the doxa: ‘Gene Police! 
You – Out of the Pool!, as Dorothy Nelkin mocks the return of this 
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genetically controlled brave new world. This is the spirit of DNA 
trailblazer, James Watson himself, faced with escalating pollutants 
(provoking disease and genetic mutations), rising poverty, violence, mental 
illness, whatever, he responds: ‘locate [the] culprit chromosomes', adding, 
'ignoring genes is like trying to solve a murder without finding the 
murderer.' Really? The antithesis is more compelling. Had funding, for 
example, been redirected from genetic research to reducing levels of 
radiation and environmental toxins, far fewer women would have died of 
breast cancer. The discovery of cancer triggering oncogenes, decades ago, 
has not yet provided any cures for cancer. Instead, it has revealed the 
complexity of the differing processes turning genetic tissue into 
oncogenes, via viral infections and other external chemical agents. 
Ironically, as Daniel Kevles has pointed out, this is why scientists 
exploring the many factors triggering oncogenesis, which are primarily 
environmental, have found that their research is less popular with both 
their peers and the media, even facing accusations that it is not 'respectable 
genetics'. 
The rise of Darwinian medicine, with its genetic approach to the 
understanding, prevention and cure of disease has from the beginning 
highlighted primarily the ways in which science, biology, culture and 
politics are inextricably entangled. It creates new dilemmas, especially for 
pregnant women, held more responsible for bearing children who will be 
born, and remain, healthy. The effects of genetic profiling can also impact 
positively or negatively on people depending upon the political power and 
prosperity of the groups to which they to belong. In the USA, for example, 
the compulsory screening of African-Americans in schools and jobs for the 
disease sickle cell anaemia (to which they are more genetically prone) 
begun in1972 was opposed by many of its anticipated beneficiaries, 
knowing it would deepen already existing discrimination against them, 
causing loss of jobs and insurance provision. Rather differently, the race to 
attribute illness to genetic origins has made it easier to overlook the far 
higher incidence of poverty and inferior medical treatment in explaining 
the much greater vulnerability to of death from heart diseases and cancer in 
African-Americans.  
In contrast, as the historian of science Nancy Stepan notes, the 
predominantly more prosperous and powerful descendents of Ashkenazi 
Jews in the USA, at greater risk of the hereditary Tay-Sachs disease, have 
encouraged and welcomed genetic screening when they can, unlike more 
vulnerable groups targeted for genetic screening, ‘control the process and 
meanings attached to the outcome of such medical and genetic 
interventions’. Indeed, those most at risk of Tay-Sachs disease in the USA 
today are those born of parents who are not knowingly of Jewish descent, 
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and therefore are less likely to have been tested. Illustrating quite how 
willing, indeed determined, a particular Jewish lobby is to insist upon their 
unique racial heritage, a scientific scandal occurred recently when a group 
of European scientists published a paper in the journal Human Immunology 
demonstrating that Jews and Palestinians in the Middle East are genetically 
indistinguishable. Issues of the journal were subsequently pulped and the 
article was deleted from the scientific literature made available by the 
journal due, it was later claimed by the editors of the journal, not to errors 
made in the scientific conclusions, but because some saw them as 
expressed in a way which was ‘pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli’. When 
social definitions of people’s belongings do not map on to genetic 
definitions, and when diseases, and their causes and cures, are always 
entwined with specific social conditions and symbolic meanings, human 
genetics will always remain a highly contested area.  
The higher the hopes we place in science, the greater the need for all 
of us to be ever more attentive to its interpreters, and how their 
interpretations and used. Despite much that we have heard from science 
promoters, it is when predictions about human affairs come in the name of 
science - however speculatively - that interpreters have most cultural clout. 
In contrast, when philosophers, social or literary theorists deploy scientific 
metaphor, when movement activists make political objections, they are far 
more likely to be derided and dismissed. Let me give the last word to that 
pioneer of science studies, and target of scientists derision, Bruno Latour, 
who writes: ‘Contrary to the worries of “science warriors”, it is precisely 
when the objects of study are interested, active, disobedient, fully involved 
in what is said about themselves by others, that it sometimes happens that a 
field of social science begins imitating for good the surprising novelties of 
some of the best of the natural sciences’. The manly beasts and febrile’ 
lunatics need to learn to communicate, at least some of the time, if we are 
to provide richer visions of our possible futures.  
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